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·  The  Comtrii'ssion  at· its ·meeting in Luxembourg,  Apr.il JOth  1  o.pproved  a  proposal 
. fdr a European' Coriipany .Statute  •. Compared to the "previous Commission Is 
proposat·Of' 30: June  1970 the prop·osal  has. been amended  significantly1 
f:c>11oi·Iingi  :to  a>large  ex-tent,  the  advice given by the European Parliament 
in July 1'974·~  · 
Since  thei'·-d.ebate  of t.he -F.u:rope'an:: ·Parliament 1  extensive consult-ations  have 
t'aken ·ple,ce  l.·ith numerous  industria::ti  organizations,  trade unions,  govern-
ments  and·politiccil· parties· 38 l\;eli as  independent  €Xl'erts  in the fields 
of vrorkers  1  participation and  company  la1·t. 
The :EUropean Company  Statute -1:'-ill  provi¢Le .a.  modern rational structure for 
the· 'organization of 'companies  in Europe' a:nd  help to creat.e t.:hat  does not 
exist today '- a  coronion  market 'for. European enterprises beyond ·the  co  .. unon 
market 'for goods  and  services. 
336/X/75-E 2. 
The  pu::.·pose  o.f  the propo::ed ECS  _is  to mak·a  possible cross-frontier mergers, 
holdings  a.J:1d  common  sul:sidia::..'ies Hhich 1rrpuld  th~n exist  ?XJ.d  functibn as European 
companies.  The  proposal  is meant  to help  :i,ndustry to restructure itself by 
external gro,rth and internal reorganization and by adaption to the dimension 
of'the Common  Mc.rket  and  the requirements  of  our times. 
As  yet,  Eurcpec:.n  enterprises do not  have  the  opportunity of acting through-
out  the Community in the  same  ~:ay they c?...n  vithin the  single Member  State in 
1.>~hich they are  incorpor2ted.  They have to contend 1.-.rith  serious legal  1  practi-
cal and psychological difficulties if they Hish ·to engage  in certain cross-
frontier operations. 
'I'he  Ei.lrope::in  Company  St:J.tute  does  not  seek to replace nat;ionn.l  cornp2.ny 
13-~;s.  It is a  oonplete European Compa11ies  Act,  ~1hich 1dll exist  alongside 
them.  It  op8ns  up  a  r..e1r1  possibility for Europeen enterp:::'ises that  \vish to 
over()omc  pr<lse~1t  legc.l  difforences  and practical difficulties in cross.;. 
frontier  op3ra·"1ons. 
'!Jl1c  Eur::>pean  Company  Statute is optional.  No  enterprise is compelled to 
use this legal  frammvork.  They  cr<n  choose to do  so 1  if they fulfil  the 
requirernents  oi:'  the  StA.tute  ,_  including the provisions for  ~·orkers'. partici-
pation in the decision-making process of the  enterprise  on the supervisory 
board,  in the l!,uropcan 1-Jorks  Council  and through collective bargaining. 
'l.'he  Community's  a.hility to respond effectively to the political problems 
~-;hich 2.rice today1  and vdll undoubtedly 2.rise  i'1 the future,  depends to a 
great 'cxtEmt  upon the existence  of solid structura:!:. fcundat io:qs.  Hi  thout 
such a  structure,  the Community is like  1:\  modern building Hithou-t ·its steel 
:fra!l'le.  vfuen  thE':  winds bloH it h'ill fall r.part.  One  of the  elements  in this 
structural foundation 1  not  perhaps the  mcst  cen·cral  compo!1ent,  but  certeinly 
a  v(3ry  iinportar-ct  C'ne 7  is a comn:on  legO:l  frarr..dv'OI'k.  The  looser economic 
tr2..ding  arrinigemer-.ts  :1ppropriate in the  i950s  and. the  1960s \Jill not  enable 
the Corrurrmity to meet  thu  great~r challenges  of the  1970s  2-nd  1980s~- The 
institutions of the 'Community  must  move  on to construct a common  raarket  in 
tte full  sense~  a  solid eoor!;:>roic,  social  ar.d  J.egal  foundation fur  J.:he  Co~i  ty. 
The  European Company Statute is a  sign{ficant part  of that  common  legal 
framrri·wrk. 
Ei1terp:r.ises  cannot  todb..y  adopt  lega:!.  structur~s 1·;hich are  approprie,te to 
the  scEtle  A.nd  rt:<:uirem0nts  of 'the Europ0ai1  rr.JJ.rket  in which they operate· or 
T:rish  to operate.  The  European Con:pari.;y  s·;;e,tute  will provide ·themr,rith such 
o.  structure e..ri.d,·moreovcr,  a  stru9ture  of·'a'modern·sophisticated kind,  which 
offers protection for the  leg-itimate  in·terests  of ail concerned in the 
ru:r:ming  of the  enter-prise~.- In !ik'l.king  this structure availc.ble,  the European 
CornrJany  Statute ,  ... ill provide  a  real  stimulus for  econor:iic  activi·cy  throu<'~h­
out  the  C01mrruni ty.  For enterprises 1riill  have the opportunity to choose· a 
modern coryorate form \vhioll  enablec them to operate as European_ enterprises 
and thereby increase their e:fficier:.cy,  co:;npe~itiveness  vis-~-vis the outside 
Horld  and  strength,  in their mm interest  c:;.ncl,  hhat  is more,  in the  interest. 
of  society c:.s  a  Nhole. 
The  purpose  of the European Compc>.ny  St.a.t'ute  is not  to  encm.crage  bigness 
in industry 3.S  G'lch,  but  to free enterprises from  leg:1l 5  'pra,ctice~ e.nd 
psychoiogical cons·craints derivl.ng from the existchce  of nine  separe.to  legal 
systems.· These  constraints at  present  iT:hi.bit  enterprises from arranging 
their affai.rs and  relationships with other -entorprisG.3  in the  r:1anr.er  vJhich 
Pould  othervJise. be  the  most  efficient..  a.nq.  profitable  jus·i  a~1  a  n2>tional 
company does  in relation to its domestic  mo.rket.  Small  a.."'ld  u1edium-sized  firms ") 
...;• 
cc:..n  benefit  as  much  r1s  large  ones  from this opportunity. 
The  Statute ::ill facil}_tate  the  formn.tion  of  ne~J  muHi-n.'ltiom:.l  comparnes, 
but  of  a  different  type.  Nrult:i.n.::::tiono,ls  Ehich choose to take  advantage  of the 
nm• EuropearJ  form v•ill  have  a  transpar2.nt  structure  m:.d  clear cblig2.t ions  in 
relation to sho.rehoJders,  creditors;  employees  rmd  society as  a  1irhole.  This 
Hill constitute  CJ,  step  t01-'E"-rds  os-!:,ccblishing  a  modern uniform comp2.ny  l::n; 
applica.bJe to European multi-na-cional  cc,mp<:nies  t:1roughout  the  Community. 
III.  The~d  :cor:...;._~E:.J?loyec::_.P._G·r.t iC~J2.~1.t ion 
The  interests  of  society rJ.l'e  increasingly relatecl.  ·co  \1ider considerations 
th<m  economic  efficicnc,;r. 
This is novrhere  more  true  ·L.!i<::.:c:  in the field of com;J<:my  lav:.  In recent 
years there  ha:::  bec11  c;,n  inc.;rce..s.ing  l~ecogni  tion 7  that  j_n  order to  ensure that 
comp.s.:n:.es  opernte for  the  benefi.  t  of.  tl'"o  society as  a  -;·Thole 7  othel~ interests 
than those  of th:;  in"jestor 1  ontre:r;reneur  a.nd  m<:mage:r·  shouJ.cl  be  able to 
influence the  (l::cis"~orr.12ldng of the  comp,::;.ny.  Employees  have  interests in 
tho  funct~_onir.g oi'  th:.:'  cn+Je:CFi..'i;.:;es· vhich  2.re  as  substantial  ::1-s  those  of 
shareholders  nnd.  som'3times  more  so.  E~11ployees not  only derive  -:;heir  income 
from the  enterprises  1.Jhich  emplo;y  them?  ruT.  thoy devote  a  large proportion 
of their d<iily livas to the  ::-·.ctivities  of the  enterpr:!.se. 
Decisions  tDlcen  ":Jy  the enterprise have  substantiaJ. effects  on their 
economic  circums·ca.r.ces 7  their hec.lt.h  ancl  physical  condi~;ion 1  tho  satisfaction 
they derive fron FOl'k 1  the  time  and energy the;y  co.n  c:'cvote  ·';o  their families 
and to acti<Iities  othe1·  tt~.Y1  '·or.k,  ;c,nd.  even their dicni·!-.y  PlJ.d  o.utonomy  as 
human  beings. 
It is therefore not  sul'pricing that  the  problem of  h'J~''  a.r.d.  to Fhat 
extent  employees  should be  able  to  influence decisions  of the  enterprises, 
1-.•hich  GT'lploy  them,  has  ·oeCOTf!O  2.  problem  of  pEcramount  intC'l'GSt  in all fJiembor 
States.  The  Euro:oe<m  CoElf!lunities  cc:.n  .:-~nd  should play  c~n  iopcrtant  role  in 
the  see,rch for prc,:::tical  GleEms  to  ensl..'_ro  emploJree  p?,rticipation.. 
This is e,ll  t!1o  more  true  in the  c1.~rn;nc  period of profound  economic 
and  social  chc:·,nge  i!l the  1;orl~  .•  '1':!.10  w;;-:  sHl,.;.cction  rel:c.t{ug to energy  nnd 
other  ra':T  I:later:i.o.ls_llc\S  ch2,ngecl  the  ocor  ... omic  o~1vironmcmt  of the enterprises. 
The  need  fc>r  in<iustria.l  reorge,:1j_:3ation  hcJ.S  increased 1-:hilc;  ;::_t  the  same  time· 
the prospects for  irn;ned.iC',te  1::ago  ~.ncrep.ses he,ve  becorile  more  lini  ted.  Conse-
quently,  conflicts  of  i1'1terest  1)et:;een diffm·ent.  groups  are  mere  acutely 
fel-;;. 
But  precisel~r in  s"Jch  r~  period of  economic  and  scc:i.e.l  tension there  is 
even  more  neec_  fer  o;:'fecti  ve  r.1echanisms  '·;here  'by  those  invoJ.'Jod  and  erilployed 
in industr,y co.n  :::espond quickly ar.d  sensibly to the  l'equirer.onts  of the 
situatior..  D}fficult  prooler1s  ~:ill to  easier to  sohre  properly7  fairly and 
1·:ith  2.  rr.inim11:rn  of Fasteful cvnfronte,tion if there  ere  mechanis!Tls  vh:lch  involve 
2.ll  those  affected in the. process  of fi:Jding  solutions.  Here,  decision-
ml:lking  rilachinery  ::d  enterprise  levol  c:md  1·ii thin tho  enterprise undoubtedly 
he.s  a:.1.  io:nportc.·,nt.  p2-r·';  to play.  'i'he  Community >'ould  fni_l  to make  its 
contribution to ecorlor:1ic  and  so-.;io:,l  progress if it  ::r;-e:!:·looked  the  problem 
of reconciling· tl1e  princip.".l  interest  groups  in our  s0ciety. 
IV  •  .Qpinion  of  the  Th'rouea:n  Pe1rE2~ment 
'I'he  Enropec:.n  Parliament  in July 1974  r.ith a  large  1;1<-cjorny  npproved  the 
policy,  th.::;  co~1cept  8'1d  the  princ.Lples  unde:dying th2  Cornmission 
1 s  original 
proposal  of  Jcme  1970.  ::-J:m-~evcr,  ~hl'CS kinds  of  o.mendnents  '"er2  proposed~ 
numerous  r,mccdrrKmt s  of  s  technical m·,t.ure  1 
several  amenc>_r;·,ents  of  somo  eco'.1omic,  leg-al  PlJ.d  (or) political significance, 
end 
a  fe•d  c:.r:iendm<:mts  of  ~igh poli.tical significance::. As  far as the technicc.l  e1:nendments  q,re  concerned1  most  of them have  been 
accepted by Hr.  GundelcYih  on beh.::tlf  of the C01:1mission,  during the debate  in 
the Plenary because thoy v:ere  amelioratiQns  or did not  raise problems.  The 
fevr  technical  an:endments  not  acceptable  P.re  of minor  importance. 
As  to the  amendments  of  some  economic·,  lege.l  and (or) political signifi-
oance,  aguin the·  Commission agrees  in all but  hro  instanoes with th.e  European 
P9.r liament : 
The  Commission  wi~hes, to maintain 
the possibility offered to Europee.n Companies to opt  for  several registered 
offices, 
and it does net  consider that 
the  s::mctions for the  offences  committed  ag~inst  prov~s~ons of the 
E.'u~opcan Compsnies Regulation  shoul~. be  regula·~ed in detail at  Community 
le7el. 
1.  Access  ---
Concern:i:ng~  the  problem of the  access to the European Company  the Commission 
proposes ·to  open  z.ccecs  uot  only to  soci6t~s enonymes  (as proposed in 1S70) 
but  c.lso to· .cor.:par.ies with limited responsibility and other  corpo1~atc l?odies 
for the  :'ornation ;)f  i:l  CuiDffiOn  S\ll'>sid::l.ry;  Rnd  to l01r1er  the  LJ.inilimm  capit.'al  f,)r 
mergers  .:md  holding companies to  250 1000 RE  e.nd  for com11on  subsidiaries to 
lCO, 000  RE •. 
2.  Taxation 
The  J!,'uropoan  Companies  ~"'i·ll.·oonform to:the;ea.me taxation rU.les  as national 
companies  ax_d  T:Jill  benefit  on  the  same  basis as nntionn.l 'companies  from the 
provisions  of the di:rcctivo  on the  common  ta.x  treatme;'lt  of pe.rent  companies 
c.nd  their 3ub::;;idiaries  of different  Hember  S-t;ates,  and tho  di:i:-e'Ctive  o~ 'the 
COiiJI,lOll  '.S3'Stem  of taxation ap:T)licable  in the Oase  of me::.•gers,  divisions and 
contribut..ivn -of  assets ·i;c-king place  beh;ecm compani3s  of c1iffere:nf l•Iember 
States,  v'hich -vrere  propo£ec1  by  ~:he Commission tc th.J  Courtci.l  in 1969  ( O.J. 
No.  C 39  of  22.3:1969).  .  .  . 
The  Commission  supported ·ey  the Europ0a:n Parliament  therefore  no\1  t;ll:es 
the  opp-ortunity to drmv  the.attcntion of'·the-CoU.ncil to'its.timetable for 
the aboli  ti..m'l  o~ fiscal barriers to closer relathms betT·!een  undertakings as 
Hid do1rm  in tho resolution of December  1973. 
V.  Ait~'22.!!;rr'0_of p.ilitical_ si~ificance. 
These'· ccucern three  issues: 
t:ne  represent,ri;tion· of  eirrployees  in tho  Sup~rvisory  ·Board of a  E'J.r-:>per.:n 
Compa.n;r, 
the problem of hoN  to choose  the  representatives of the  employ'Jes  for 
the  Supe:~visory Boo.rd  anJ.  tl:e .nembers  of the European l'rorks  Council,  and 
ti'te  povrers  of tl:).e  Europe<~n horks Council. 
The  Commission  ho.s ·decided to· modify its origino..l proposal ·in accordance 
with the  opinion· of Parli::>.nent. 
1. Cr;,~osition of  8unerviso_~Y :Soa!.1'!. 
'l'he  Supervisor;>' Board shell consist  as to  one  third of re;;>resentative3  of 
the  s-nareholclers,  e,s  to  one third of represcnte.tive3  of the  employees,  and 
as to  one third cf members  co-opted by these  tYo  groups 1'"ho  are to be  indG-
pendent  of both  shr:;.reholders  and  employees  2-nd  to  rcp:.~escnt "gener<  .. l  interests". 
i 
l 5 • 
.  ..  The  propose~l to. div~de· .the  number  of .se2.ts  on the Supervisory Board  into 
t:hree. -e<:fU:a.i 'parts 'is . iptendE;d. t 0- avo:ld  some  of the  organizat  ionJ.l'-political 
c.>-nd  psyoJ:iological ~ciifficul  ties. uhich could resu'l  t'  ·.on  the  Etlrope~n level  from 
a  represe~t.~~-i.on ra:ti-o  of  50t50  bet1·!~eh  shareho~der and  employee  representati-
ves_.: In p~rtipul.ar t,he  proposal'_attempts to preven-t deadlock  situe.tions arising 
1.-.rhich  .m~_ght< adv~rse~y affect  t.he.economic  efficiency of· tho undertaking.  The 
e-ddi tionai proposal .that  _the  tote.l  riU:mber -of  members  of the -Supervisory 
Boar'd sho~ld  be~  unen.r~n1 is aiso intended to reduc~ this·. de-nger.  Moreovers  the 
p:roposed  one  third- one third- one  third forJ:.lllla.laaa  the 
attractive  .. feature. of enabling other,< broader interests than tho'se  of the 
shareholders  a.nd. employees  to  be  represented  on the  Su~pervisory Board  .• 
On  the  other hand,  if the  representa.tion of shareholders is reduced to 
one  third giving another third to the  employees  and the final third toother 
defined interests,  there is said to be  the risk of reducing the  incentive 
,_com:pahi.es  .niay  .hav:e  .fo~ using the European  Compc:~.:ny  form  .•  _H.o.v-reY.ei'  _it.  should 
'!1o·t- be.  overlo-oked  th;;.:t  -l~(;  roe~b~r -~f the  :Une.l third ·ce.n  be ·c·o:=...op.t.e_d  Hi  thout 
the_ consent  0f  at  lee.st  some  of the  shareJ:10lders 
1  representntives :because 
each: co.;opted  member  needs  at ·least  t1·!o  :thirds. of the  combined votes  of the 
·shareholders'  and the· employees  1  represeintati  vos.  · 
.  'l'he _co-opted  members  ,of  the  fine.l  t~ird must  represent  "general  in:terests
11
• 
This  concept  is :lntended to cover all interests affected by the activities 
of  ..  e.  European Company  other than thosE;)  of the  shareholders  and  er::~ployees 
_directly involved  •.  The  concept  must  be  seen a:::. one  element  together l<ith 
ti:vo  other requirements,  that  is _that  these repreSentatives be)'not directly 
dependent  ·on  the  shareholde:r-s,  the  employees  or their respective organizn-
tionsn  and  have  "the necess<?,ry knm;ledge. ;:mel  experience".  The. tlnderlying 
idea is that the  representn.tives col!stituting the final .third Hill enable 
the Supervisory Board to take decisions vhich take  into consideration all 
interests" affected  ,by_  j;;l}e""•ctiyittes.  o:f  the European Compe.ny,_  i·n  other Nerds 
to recognize the  specicl  r_esponsibilit;y  ~f the enterprise fcn-re~rd  those 
interests  • 
.  - ·.Since  the<"general interests"  .s.re  not  defined in a  concrete  Hay,  the 
proposed ~system hc:s  some  sim~Uarity.Fith the  system of the "eleventh. rocm" 
prevc..iling .~n the Germcm  coal 1:-.nd  steel industry since 1951  T._rho  is to be 
co..:opted .by<t}le  reprcsentat'ives of the  ~harehoHers and  of the  employees  on 
the Supervisory Boe..rd.  Nevertheless there are  subst2..ntial  differences.  Since 
the f.in:?-1  third of  members ·on  the Supervisory Board  of an S.E.  Pill norlilally 
consist  of  2-.t  lee,st  throe  members,  there ,,Jill be  not  just  a  single member, 
. but  a  plurality of  independent  members  ~-rho  are dl equally entrusted Hith 
preventing a  deadlock in the  Supervisory Board  of  the  S.E~ 
The. proposed  system also contains  substcmtial  elements  of the ·.Dutch 
system .in force  since  1973.  The  ce.ndidates eligible for  co-option are ·:t·o 
be  proposed by the  Geriero.l  Meeting,  the Horks  Council  c1.nd  the  Management 
Board  b.s  under Dutch company  lac'.'•  Accordingly,  the General Meeting,  the 
European Harks  Council  and the  Iv'L::magement  Board are  each expected to propose 
candidates T:.:ho  1;i1l  have  the necessary knovl~dge and  experience,  \·'ill defend 
the  long term interests of the enterprise as  2.  Fhole  ~  a.nd  Fill therefore 
probe~'bly be.  acceptr;,ble~ to  bq_t1J.  shc>-reholders 
1  an¢1  employGes 
1
- representatives. 
T;tle  shareholders  I  and  the  employees  I  represemtc.tive~ on the Supervisory 
Board ilill then probcbly eleCt  those of the oc:mdide..tes  nomin.:::.ted  by the three 
organs '\-;hom they predict Eill act  as  niediators  und conciliators r2..ther  than 
a  substrmtial third force,  e.t  le_<Cst  as  far as the.  last  man  to. be  co-opted is 
concerned,  for the total mimber  of the  tfJombers  of the Board  must  be  uneven. 
As  experience 1>!ith  the  system in the Gerr:u?.n  coal  and steel  indl.)-stry  sholtJS, 
an uneven number tends  to favour  compromise  cc.ndidn.tes  ~:rho  subsequently act 
as .mediators  cmci  concil:i.o,tors.  . .  . 
The  proviso that  the- shc.reholders  1  and the employees i  representatives 
have to choose  among  lists of  candidates  submitted to them by. the .Qeneral 
Meeting,  the  ~{orks Colincil  and the  Mr-.nagement  Board is to  some  extent  a r  o. 
supplementary guarantee  agcl.imrf,  the  C\hoio'e  of nonentities.  Sincod  the lists 
of Ccmdiddes  1/Jil~  probe.bly be  a  n"'tter' af' public_ krio:de<lge,  the  nomil'mt ory 
bodies Fill feel  obliged io put  forl'.rc-'rd  candid,~tes \·,;ith  rf?pUtt.dion Which 
1-:ill  r:.ot  attr<wt  undue criticism. of the l'}Ominating- body i t;self  • 
. It· nill not· be  m::~ildntory for  employeas  J.,o  be 'represented on the Super-
visory Board.  It is left to the employees ·to decide - rrith a ·simple  me.jority 
- \-vhethor  they vrish to participate in the Supervisory Board  of an S.E. ·.or 
not.  If not,,thecSuporvisory Board Nill consist  of representatfves of 
shareholders  only·,  fulfilling its riormn.l  functions. It v10uld  not  correspond 
to the normal  rules. of democracy if a  minority of employees  in:  :fc:w.-our  of 
employees  representation·· l·'ere  able to impose  -~h:)ir viev;s  on  a  reluctant 
majority.  ·  · 
2•  .B.epre.~e}_r~ations  of  -tr:1.de~~:lons by pe:rso~  ..  _:r~t  ernploy0d  by the European 
CnmJ?££1l' 
'.i.
1he  ESC  gives the  stn.tutory right to the  tr2.de  unions  represented  i,n  the 
establislments of the S.E.  to· submit  lists of cMdidates for the election of 
the  employees'  representatives to the Supervisory Board.  The  lists can include 
a  rr.inori ty of trade union c::.:ndida:tes  from  O'Qt side the enterprise,  lee>.ving 
the elt"!Ctors to express their preferences. 
It is thus left to the olectors and not·. to the  law to decide  ;·rhe+,her 
persons not  emplo~·ed by the -S.·E.  become  employee's 1  representatives  on the 
SupBrvis.ory l:lbc.rd.  The  l0gitil.1le.tion  oZ all of the· representatives of the 
en:Ployees' on the baerd d<;}pouds  on their t:Jloction,  ·th::-.t  is on the Hill of 
the  I:lajority.. of the. employees  of the Europoru1  Compim.y. 
3.  Eles!i2E_. of .em.Ployces 
1  represeE!f·,tives to tho  St}J2ClWisory B~ 
Grider  th,e.  elect~.ori rules ·the choice  of  employees  1  representt1tives takes 
place norll'.ally in t1·o ·stages. 
First  stage:  n.E  employee3  elect  in the  este.bhshments  of the·S.E.  a 
number  of electoraL delegates·b;y- secret direct be,llot.  'l'he  election is· 
subject  ..  to the principle. of proportional  ropresentr-.tion.  Lists of c.:uididates 
llk'l.Y  be  sul:l!t!itted  by. trc-.de:  'mions represented in the establishment  cmd  by 
groups  of  employees  enti  +.les to vote. 
lo%  01'  100 emplo;:/ees  :i.n  e.n  establishment  is the  minimum  requirement  for 
putting up  n.  lis·t:;  of cc,ndidf'.tes. 
Second  ste.ge:  th.e  olectornJ.  delegates elect the  employees'  representatives 
to  -~he S_upervisory Bo:'..rd  jointly by means  o:f  a  secret  ~allot. They nast 
exer9ise their voting rights freely and  must  not  be  bou.  ..  YJ.d  bY'  e..ny  instructions. 
The  election is subject to the principle of proportional representu.tion. 
Lists of candid<.'..teG  may  be  submitted by the l!..'uropean  Horks Council, 'by 
trade unions represented in the establishments of tho S.E.,  by  1/:::'0 of the 
elect.oral delegatecl. or by  ~t  least 1/10 of  the  employees  of the S.E. 
4.  §_lE},£.tion  of_ergplozoe~'f'~ref';,S~t~s to t~F.uroponn N~kA.  Council 
The  n:emberf.!  o-f  the European  lrJol~ks  C-ouncil  ere elected by c-11  employees 
of -the  S.E..,  by secret direct bali'ot;.  Lists· of candiriatos  may  be  submitted 
by trade unions  represented in t.he  establis'hment  and  by c;:roups  of emplcyees 
( 10%  .or  100 employees).  The  election is subj0ct to -the  principle  of pr·cpor--
t.ione..l  representation. 
rrhe-Eu.ropean i;·Jorks  Council  is thought  to be the ::-eprescnta-tiv0  body  of 
all  empl-oyee's. em.ployed  in 6s-tablishments  of the S .E.,  irrespective  of \:,hetller 
tliey_. P.;re.  orgs..n-ized  in treiie. unions  or not.  Henc0,  there 1r:ust  'bo  ~irect and 
.secret  ..  eloctions in  ·-vJhich all er::.plcyee3  of the  r.:ispoctive  estJ.blishr.ient  can 
pe..r'j;:i,.cipc..te.  IJ.'his  is -cf p::1.rticul8.r  sigaific'?..nce  in the  C<'!.se  ol  UJ:lc1~rt<'....lcings 
~ 
I vJhich  hc:we  establishments in severo.,l  Member  States - ::md it is only then 
that  a  Europe2n \Torks  Council  is created.  The  degree  of  organization of 
v.rorkers -{n  a  trade union varies as  much  from  one  Member  Stcite  to cmother  C'.S 
it does  from  one  bra.'1ch  of  industry to another.  -
But  the  degree  of the  legitimation of the  members  of the European Works 
Council  should not  differ ::1nd  depend upon the degree  t.o  which  labour is 
organized in  ee>..ch  establishment. 
All  employees  of the S.E. 7  moreovor 1  should enjoy the  same  rights 
relating to  information,  consultation and co-decision.  These  are  intended 
to be  statutory rights  <md  therefore not  reserved to  org<mi zed  groups,  but 
cWC:',iL:~ble  to 2-ll  employees  in n.ccord2..ncc  Hi th democratic  principles. 
This  cloes  not  mean  that  trc.de  unions  o.re  in o.:ny  Hay sxcluded from having 
members  on Europo<m Forks Councils.  Hhere  an election takes plt:..ce,  they 
have  an  equnl right to  submit  lists of candidates.  In addition,  the European 
vJorks  Council  mo.y  2.t  <.1ny  time 7  by  f!k~.jority vote;  invite  a  representative 
from  <".  tro.de  union represented in an  estnblishmcnt  of the S.E.  to  ::tttend 
certain meetings  in nn  c..dvisory capacity. Furthermore,  experts  may  be 
called in to clarify certain difficult questions  and these  experts cnn be 
drmm from the  ranks  of trn.de  unions. 
5.  P01-:ers  of the European Harks  Cou.ncil 
The  European Hor1--=s  Council  is competent  for  2.11  m._-:·,tters  \•Jhich  concern 
the S.E.  as  a  Hhole  or  several  of its establishments.  'rhe  Harks Council is. 
to be  kept  regularly informed  on the  general  economic  position of the  S~E. 
r:md  of its future  development. It has to be  consulted before  important 
economic  decisions nffecting the  employees  ~re taken.  Decisions concerning 
certain social matters  may  be  ~'de by the  Bo~rd of Management  only Hith 
the  agreement  of the Europenn Forks Council.  If the Europec:m 1rJorks  Council 
1·iithholds its agreement,  agreement  may  be  given by n  court  of  arbitre.ti.on 
:,:hose  members  2.re  ::cppointed  by the European Harks Council  e.nd  by the  Bonrd 
of Ivlenagement • 
The  Europecm Vorks  Council  must  give its agreement_ to decisions plcmned 
by the  Board  of M.:mc.goment  concerning the  establishment ·of a  social plan in 
the  event  of closure  of the S.E.  or  of parts thereof.  Before  making  any 
decisions relating to the winding up  of  ~mdertnkings and  mergers  \·Ji th other 
undertc::._ldngs,  the Boo.rd  of 1\lhnC:l.gement  must  consult  the European Harks 
Council. 
On  the  other hand,  the competence  of the Europee.n Uorks. Council  sh<ccll 
extend  only to  mo_tt8rs  1i·!hich  do  not  involve the negotiation or conclusion' 
of conventions  or collective agreements concerning the Parking conditions 
of  employees.  Thus  o.  demnrcation line has  been  clr2.~m betc-:cen the pm1ers  of 
the Europec:il Harks  Council  and  of the trade unions. 
The  Europecn r-:orks  Council  is not  to interfere vith the  role  of trade 
unions nor 1·1ith  the duties  of employee  represento.tives  org2.nized at  plant 
level under national  ~rr2.ngements.  These  represent2,tives Hill continue to 
exercise their functions,  unless  othor-crise  provided  in the Stn,tute.  Such 
provisions exist  only in cu,ses _'-:here  a  uniform representation of all employees 
affected by  e..  decision of the Mnnngement  Board is desiro.ble  both for the 
representation of employees'  interests and the vi2-bility of the decision 
making process uithin the European Compnny.  Nor  is collective bargni:r.ing 
on Harking conditions  a  matter for the European 1rlorks  Council.  The  draft  of 
the  amended proposal expressly prevents the Europe<.1n  Horks  Council  from 
engaging in such procedures,  unless it is authorized to do  so by tho contrac-
ting p<:.rties Fithin a  Europeon collective  e..greement. It is hereby intended 
to forestall  any possible conflict Hith the  functions  of the trc.de  unions. 
Indeed,  the proposed Europeen- Compr-ny  St::.tute goes  much  further thnn 
that  and gives the tr2.de  unions tho  ne1_·J,  c>.dditiom:l  opportunity to operate 8. 
effectively in the  specific  environment  of n  comprmy working at  a  trC'.l'ls-
national level.  To  those  ends,  it incluc'!.es  proYisions  eno.bling the European 
Co:apa:ny  to conclude  ?..greemen·l:;s  t1ith -the  tr~1e unions represented in its 
di::'ferent  est?,blishments  on working conciti:)ns v.rhich  o.re  binding through-
out .the Commllni i;y  for all employees 11ho  are  merabers  of a  trD.de·  .. union vrhich 
is a  pe:rty to such  an  acrecment. 
This reflects the feeling that the European Company vJill  function better 
if the traae unions  nre  sufficiently organized and possess specific righte 
at the transnctional level  on v;hich the  compa..ny  1-vorks  and  are thus able 
to play an active role in the life of the undertaking. 
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